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Drodzy Czytelnicy.

Trzynasty zeszyt *Silva Iaponicarum* to zarazem pierwszy zeszyt w czwartym roku działalności periodyku. Dziękujemy naszym czytelnikom oraz autorom artykułów za trzy lata wsparcia dla naszego projektu. Planujemy dalsze sukcesywne rozwijanie formuły wymiany myśli proponowanej przez *Silva Iaponicarum*.

W zeszycie zamieszczamy dwa artykuły z dziedziny nauk społecznych.

Oczekujemy na rozpoczęcie największego tegorocznego wydarzenia w polskiej japonistyce, październikowej międzynarodowej konferencji japonistycznej w Krakowie. Już teraz dziękujemy kolegom z Krakowa za wkład w organizację tego wydarzenia.

Kolegium redakcyjne

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Dear Readers,

The thirteenth fascicle of *Silva laponicarum* is the first fascicle in the fourth year of the activity of our periodical. We would like to thank our readers and contributors for their support for our project over the past three years. We are also planning to successively develop the formula of *Silva laponicarum* in order to further promote exchange of ideas and foster the intellectual undertakings in Japanese Studies.

The fascicle contains two articles from the field of social studies.

We are awaiting the beginning of the most important event of this year in Polish Japanology, the international conference on Japanese studies to be held in Cracow in October. We would like to thank our colleagues from Cracow for their contribution to the organization of this event.

The editorial board

E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl

Poznań-Warsaw-Kuki, September 2007

読者のみなさまへ

Silva laponicarum 第13号は本誌刊行4年目の第1号でもあります。読者・投稿者のみなさまが3年間にわたって私たちの企図をご支持いただいたことにお礼申しあげます。私たちは、*Silva laponicarum* が提起するような意見交換のあり方を今後もさらに発展させていく心つもりです。

本号には、社会科学分野の論文を2本掲載いたします。

私たちは、本年度ポーランド日本学界最大の出来事、10月にクラクフで開かれる国際日本学会の開催を心待ちにしているところです。この場を借りて、その準備にご尽力くださっているクラクフ日本学科の仲間たちに、心よりの謝意を表します。

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Social Costs of Meiji State Transformation

Waves of Globalization

How shall we call the process, that began in Japan in a middle of the 19th C. and is still going on? Sometimes it is called modernization, but this concept doesn't fit the situation of Japan in the middle of the 19th C, since modernization implies some conditions, which were not present in Japan.

The term „modernization“ appeared and was much in use in sociology and political science in the context of American research programs of 1950s and 1960s. It was applied to large-scale social and economic changes similar to those occurring in Europe between the 17th C. and 19th C. This meaning of “modernization” was used by Lerner, Coleman, Eisenstadt and Parsons. “Modernization” was a set of processes taking place outside Europe and the USA, but similar in type to European and North American.¹ In this way “modernization” was just a new word for an older concept of “Westernization” or “Europeanization.” Still earlier, when Japan began to undergo large-scale social changes, those changes were called “a process of civilizing the barbarians”.

“Modernization” thus implied changes that led to progress, better future, and was supposed to be a realization of an ideal society which might exist elsewhere and was considered superior. In short, such concept of “modernization” was an optimistic view of a social change. Social costs of modernization were considered insignificant or were simply overlooked.

We can point out here that the concept of modernization presumes some level of continuation of existing conditions, as it is impossible to modernize something which doesn't exists. This aspect of modernization theory was usually overlooked by its advocates. However, in the case of Japan (and not only Japan), “modernization” required destroying old forms of social organization and creating totally new ones.

¹ See for example Lerner, Daniel 1968. “Modernization. Social Aspects.” (in:) Sills, David L. (ed.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Vol.10. New York: Macmillan/Free Press; Ward, R. and Rustow, D. (ed.) 1946. *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press; Eisenstadt, Samuel 1966. *Modernization: Protest and Change*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; Parsons, Talcott 1971. *The System of Modern Societies*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; Therborn, Göran “Modernities and Globalizations.” (in:) B. Isenberg (ed.) 1998. *Sociology and Social Transformation*. Lund: The Lund University Dept. of Sociology.

As Göran Therborn points out, the concept of modernization suffers from serious analytical shortcomings. There was never any attempt undertaken to define “modernity”.²

The concept of “modernization” is too vague to be used when analyzing a social change. Besides, it suffers from a lack of global empathy – European and/or North American institutions of social life and ways of economic organization are said to be better and deserve emulation more than any other social or economic solutions.

This last feature connects modernization theories with theories of globalization, particularly those describing globalization in purely economic terms (Immanuel Wallerstein). Belief in an absolute superiority of capitalism (in its American version) over any other economic order is a feature peculiar to the most popular globalization theories.³ Some authors express the opinion that the processes of globalization happen in a way best described as „deus ex machina”, that globalization is an effect of the working of markets (and their invisible hands), that it just happens and it is beyond our power to stop or to slow it down. This mechanical, inhuman character of globalization contributes much to social fears and anxieties, and creates in some societies a feeling of guilt, in some other – anger. If we assume that Anglo-American capitalism lies at the roots of all of the globalization evils, then the 19th C. “white man’s burden” becomes “white man’s guilt”, as it is he who let the globalization genie out of the bottle. This somehow explains the popularity of anti-globalization movements in Europe and America.

In globalization theories we often find an assumption that globalization is a new kind of process, unknown in pre-capitalist societies/economies, and that it leads to a homogenization of local cultures. Thus it is easy to point out that it leads to “cultural imperialism”, to “McDonaldization” or “Cocacolonization”. But we should not overlook processes known as “creolization”, or “hybridization” that accompany globalization.⁴

² See Therborn, Göran 1998. “‘Modernization’ discourses, their limitations, and their alternative.” Paper presented at the conference *Paradigmen des sozialen Wandels*. Berlin-Branderburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 3-5 September 1998.

³ Wallerstein, Immanuel 2000. “Globalization or the Age of Transition? A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World-System.” *International Sociology* 15 (2). See also Giddens, Anthony 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

⁴ Robertson, Roland and Khondker, Habib Haque 1998. “Discourses of Globalization. Preliminary Considerations.” *International Sociology* 13 (1). See also Beyer, Peter – “Globalizing Systems, Global Cultural Models and Religion(s).” *Ibid.*

Göran Therborn disagrees with one-dimensional theories of globalization and presents a concept of historical waves of globalization, with accompanying deglobalization processes.⁵ According to Therborn, “discourses on globalization mean a spatialization of the social.” He introduces a temporal factor through the “waves.” With the introduction of a temporal factor, “globalization” becomes “globalizations,” and the world acquires a complexity which has been overlooked in the most popular theories of globalization.

Therborn proposes six waves of globalization:

1. The first wave was a diffusion of world religions and the establishment of transcontinental civilizations.⁶ The most intensive influence of this wave of globalization can be seen from the 4th C. to the 7th C. Christianity became dominant in Europe, it reached Ethiopia and Kerala on Indian Peninsula. Hinduism reached Southeast Asia, up to the Indonesian archipelago. Buddhism went from India to China, and from China it spread to Korea and Japan. Islam reached Spain and overtook the whole Arab world, from Morocco to what is now Iraq, Persia and Kashgar on the silk route, as well as Sind (now Pakistan).

By the 8th C. these religions became trans-tribal and trans-monarchical cultures. They didn't overtake the whole world, but a significant part of it. They had not only a set of beliefs, but also a common, literary language (Latin, Sanskrit, Pali or Arabic), distinctive style of architecture, esthetics and social norms.

At the same time a Sinic civilization developed and spread on much wider area than the Chinese empire. The Chinese script, Confucian doctrines and esthetic canons were accepted in Korea, Japan and – a little earlier – in northern Vietnam.

After this early wave of globalization came a tendency toward deglobalization, with a process of vernacularization (creation of local languages with their local writing systems, based on “globalized” standards, for example Japanese kana as a supplementary script). Deglobalization was strongest between the 12th C. and the 16th C.

2. The second wave of globalization was created by European colonial conquest, beginning at the end of the 15th C, and lasting for about a hundred years. It brought about a high-value trade in spices, plunder of the

⁵ Therborn, Göran 2000. “Globalizations. Dimensions, Historical Waves, Regional Effects, Normative Governance.” *International Sociology* 15 (2).

⁶ Ibid.

conquered regions (particularly of precious metals), and plantation slavery. Both Americas became a part of the multi-continental world. For two continents, namely America and Africa, it was a large-scale demographic and economic disaster.

3. The competition over colonies and contradictory interests of Europeans resulted in a third wave of globalization, based on intra-European power struggles. This was an era of first global wars, with Britain and France as main competitors, involving such faraway regions as North America, the Caribbean, India, and – through Dutch involvement – South African Cape and Southeast Asia. The wars lasted from circa 1700 to 1815, and through the Napoleonic wars encompassed the lands of Islamic empire.

4. The fourth wave of globalization was a heyday of European imperialism. It began in a middle of the 19th C. and lasted till the end of the First World War. That wave of globalization was characterized by bulk trade and trans-oceanic voluntary migrations, both enabled by development of new and faster means of transport and communication.⁷

After that we can observe the next period of deglobalization, shrinking of world trade, strengthening of nation-states and the rise of national and ethnic particularisms.

5. The Second World War was a factor, which gave a spur to the fifth wave of globalization, through declining costs of communication and transport, and accompanying rise in global trade. But Therborn states that the main thrust was political – the rivalry between the USA and the USSR and their allies and clients, encompassing almost the whole world. The Cold War was its ideological face. It peaked between mid-1970s and mid-1980s.

6. The current wave of globalization lost its political and military dimension and became financial and cultural in character. Nation-states lost control over financial markets and economic rivalry became global. Simultaneously we are witnessing a new wave of migration – this time from the South to the North and from the West to the East (from Asia through Pacific to the USA). This new migration is not followed by cultural assimilation though – new media such as Internet, the ease of transport and communication allow migrants to keep their local cultures intact in the countries of their new residency.

⁷ Ibid.

Meiji Japan - a Society Under Pressure of a Globalization Wave

Fukuzawa Yukichi, famous social critic and educator of the Meiji era, describes in his autobiography two official missions to the West he took part in as an official interpreter. Both missions took place at the end of the Edo era, both were sent by the shogunate – in 1860 to the USA, and in 1862 to Europe. Fukuzawa came back to Japan conscious of Japan's civilizational backwardness and convinced of the necessity to introduce structural changes in Japanese society and economy. He writes that he came back ashamed of his own country.

Fukuzawa writes of the difficulties he had with understanding the principles of a Parliament-based political system:

"When I asked a gentleman what the 'election law' was and what kind of a bureau the Parliament really was, he simply replied with a smile, meaning I suppose that no intelligent person was expected to ask such a question. But these were the things most difficult of all for me to understand. In this connection, I learned that there were bands of men called political parties – the Liberals and the Conservatives – who were always fighting against each other in the government.

For some time it was beyond my comprehension to understand what they were fighting for, and what was meant, anyway, by 'fighting' in peace-time. 'This man and that man are enemies in the House', they would tell me. But these 'enemies' were to be seen at the same table, eating and drinking with each other. I felt as if I could not make much out of this. It took me a long time, with some tedious thinking, before I could gather a general notion of these separate mysterious facts."⁸

Perry's black ships sailing into Edo Bay in 1853 and Americans requesting Japan to open its ports to international trade were perceived by Japanese as a defeat, as it positioned Japan as the weaker one who must agree to all demands of the enemy, including the unequal treaties. In February 1858 the bakufu, already vulnerable because of internal instability, bent under American pressure and signed the treaty opening eight Japanese ports to trade with the USA. Soon after that similar treaties were signed with other Western countries. The treaties came to be called "unequal treaties". Japanese were forced to surrender legal jurisdiction in designated ports, making them in fact extraterritorial. The treaties forced upon Japanese giving up the tariff autonomy – tariffs on goods entering or leaving Japan were set

⁸ Fukuzawa, Yukichi 1981. *The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi*, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press: 134.

in the treaties, and the Japanese government did not have the power to change them.

Unequal treaties were humiliating for Japan as an independent state, because they imposed a semi colonial status on Japan. Western powers imposed those treaties on Japan under the pretext that Japan didn't have a Western-style legal system, as well as economic and financial institutions that meet the requirements of "civilized" countries.

With the beginning of the Meiji, Japanese authorities were quick to understand the necessity of state policy concerning tariffs. Itō Hirobumi, one of participants of the so-called "Iwakura mission" in 1871 wrote in a memorandum for other participants of the mission: "Unless domestic products are cheaper than foreign products one's own people will not buy them, so one increases import tariffs in order to put up the price of foreign goods...such a tariff is called a defensive tax.... Countries like our own that have not yet attained full development will delay the arrival of civilization if they do not apply this method. For example, we should keep the tax low on domestic goods such as books and machinery and make it high on goods such as silk textiles, alcohol and tobacco, thus helping to stimulate our own production. (...)"⁹

However, Japan had its hands tied by the unequal treaties.

The process of Japan's joining the world's economic, political and cultural networks can be called a process forced from outside (not only by the American military threat, but also by the geopolitical situation in Asia), and controlled from inside. *Bakufu*, acting under the shock of black ships, tried to reform the country, but those efforts led only to further destabilization of *bakufu*'s political system and to showing its vulnerability for everyone to see. It helped the organized opposition from the middle and low-ranking samurai to emerge. Among the samurai were people, who later built the foundations of modern Japan and – after the implementation of the parliamentary system – governed the country with an iron hand hidden under the veil of democratic institutions. They were known as *genrō* (senior statesmen).

The years from 1853 to 1868 are called *bakumatsu*, or the end of *bakufu*. Those years had the feel like the end of a century, the end of an epoch. They were full of political machinations, political murders, revolts and attempts of coup d'etat. There were occurrences of mass hysteria, there

⁹ See Jansen, Marius B. 2002. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: 375.

were new cults appearing - of a type associated with the end of a millenium. These were times for young radicals who believed that violence was the best way to solve national problems. Assassinations and murders were used as means of political struggle. More and more perplexed authorities were accused of letting the “foreign devils“, “the hairy, butter-stinking barbarians“ to defile the sacred Japanese soil. The people were full of fear of the new and revolted against the old.

The Social Costs of Transforming Japan

Irokawa Daikichi, contemporary Japanese historian and the author of “The Culture of Meiji Period“, comments on Japanese encounter with the West in the 19th C. in the following way: “The influence of European and American civilization on Japan during the 1860s and 1870s was traumatic and disruptive to a degree that is rarely found in the history of cultural intercourse. (...) Any thought of ‘protecting traditional culture‘ was scorned as an idle diversion from the critical need to respond to the urgent situation that faced the country. What had to be done was to penetrate the enemy’s camp, grasp their weapons of civilization for use against them, and then turn to use them in the national interest.”¹⁰

The old social order was in a great measure abolished. The feudal system of social estates was abandoned, peasants were granted the right to purchase land, everyone could become a landowner, a merchant or an artisan. Ordinary people were granted a right to have a family name. *Bunmei kaika* (Civilization and Enlightenment) became a keyword for a new lifestyle, Western type of clothing, new manners. Samurai topknots became oldfashioned and almost completely disappeared around 1890s. A kimono worn by a male came to signify an inferior social status. Westernization of male clothes began from the police and military uniforms. In 1871 government offices started to use Western chairs and tables.

The new style of weddings, based on “new” state Shinto came into use. Japan introduced left-hand traffic rules on its roads, taking this idea from Great Britain. Mixed bathing (*kon'yoku*), an old tradition, was forbidden in Tokyo area (1869 and again in 1872) and nudity in public places was subject to fines. The *rikisha* pullers, who used to run almost naked, were obliged to put on some clothes upon entering Tokyo, otherwise they would pay a fine.

¹⁰ Irokawa, Daikichi 1985. *The Culture of the Meiji Period*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 51

Divorces, a common occurrence among ordinary Japanese¹¹ started to be frowned upon by the authorities. Newly founded police ordered the town and village constables to keep track on pregnancies – the aim was to reduce the occurrence of *mabiki*, a way to limit the number of children in poor families unable to feed them. The custom of *mabiki* was „uncivilized“, and it reduced the population growth, something which Meiji authorities started to worry about from 1890s.

New products began to appear in shops. Morinaga, a new confectioner, started a production of chocolate, a great novelty in Meiji Japan. Despite strong Buddhist traditions in Japanese society, eating meat began to be quite fashionable. There was even an ideology invented to propagate meat as food – it was to improve the physical appearance of Japanese. In 1899, in celebration of the abolition of unequal treaties, the first ever beer hall was opened in Tokyo.

However, these were the times of cultural schizophrenia, particularly in most things that concerned women. It took many years of Meiji to lift a ban on cutting women's hair short. Ordinary women who abandoned kimono for Western clothes were seen as devoid of traditional womanly virtues. On the other hand, blackened teeth and shaved off eyebrows, for many centuries a custom common among married women, quickly disappeared, beginning in 1873, when the empress stopped keeping to it herself. To be sure, in 1872 the imperial court changed Japanese court clothes for the Western ones, modeled after European nobility, and shaved eyebrows and blackened teeth certainly didn't fit the new clothes.

The times were not easy for any Japanese. Natsume Sōseki, a famous Meiji writer, noted in his diaries: "people say that Japan was awakened thirty years ago, but it was awakened by a fire bell and jumped out of bed. It was not a genuine awakening but a totally confused one. Japan has tried to absorb Western culture in a hurry and as a result has not had time to digest it."¹²

Recently the researches are apt to consider Meiji economic development as an achievement of the Japanese government. However, the human costs of it were huge – the rising economic level brought suffering and pauperization to millions of Japanese – first of all to the smallholder peasants and their families, and particularly their daughters. The Edo tradition of village solidarity disappeared, being replaced by greed and new,

¹¹ Fuess, Harald 2004. *Divorce in Japan. Family, Gender, and the State 1600 – 2000*. Stanford, California; Stanford University Press.

¹² See Jansen op. cit.: 457.

free-for-all rules of economic play. A considerable amount of land changed hands, and the winners were loan sharks operating in towns and villages. Hundreds of thousands of young girls were forced to work in silk mills in conditions resembling slavery, or were sold by families into prostitution to keep the rest of family alive. It is worth mentioning here that selling daughters into the life of prostitution was not only means of surviving for the family, but it was often a hope that the girl will have a chance for better life that way.¹³

When analysing reasons for growing economic differences in Meiji villages we should take notice of changes taking place in rural communities, as these changes facilitated the growth of economic disparities.

Under the Tokugawa rule it was the countryside which bore the burden of keeping the *buke* in relative well-being, down to the humblest samurai wasting his days on waiting for the call to the castle. Villages were heavily taxed, and taxes were paid in rice. This meant that every year of poor harvest would lower the already low level of consumption among peasants. If poor harvests continued for a couple of years, many villagers became heavily in debt to wealthier neighbors, as better-off farmers had to pay the poor one's share of village taxes. That debt had to be returned, but village solidarity usually saved the hapless debtors from a total bankruptcy. Villages formed closed communities, the shogunate imposed restrictions on accepting newcomers as members of village communities, and spacial mobility, too, was very restricted. If people moved out of their communities, this usually meant going to a large city, not to another village. All these factors resulted in high levels of village solidarity. The Tokugawa regime introduced draconian punishment for peasant leaders who presented petitions concerning lowering taxes to shogunal authorities¹⁴. However, despite the dislike for peasant protest, shogunal authorities did lower village taxes in some cases. Tokugawa rule was very strict, but strove to keep to Confucian principle of fairness.

The situation in the villages was gradually getting out of hands of shogunal authorities yet before the end of the Tokugawa rule, but it were the reforms in early Meiji which totally destroyed the old village life. First of all, when Japan opened to the world trade, Japanese farm products became a sought-

¹³ See Gordon, Andrew 2003. *A Modern History of Japan*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 100-102.

¹⁴ This forced villagers to hide the names of petition leaders by signing the petition around a circle, so as no one's name would be the first name under the petition.

after commodity. Before Japan built its industrial base, it was farm products which could earn Japanese government desired foreign currency – most of all silk and tea.

In 1868, when Tokugawa rule came to an end, and the young Meiji emperor moved from Kyoto to Edo, the gods smiled. A silk blight in Europe opened European silk markets to Japanese silk cocoons, raised on small family farms. After a few years, when the blight ended, Japanese silk traders already had a foothold in European markets and began to do brisk business in silk thread. In a short time the USA became a major importer of Japanese silk thread, too. Between 1868 and 1893 raw silk production rose almost fivefolds, and silk products made up 42% of Japanese export.¹⁵

To satisfy a foreign demand for silk thread, rural entrepreneur elite began to open small, local factories. The owners were well-off members of village communities, those owning more land than others, very often members of families beeing for generations village headmen – *shoya-san*. The main source of work force were young peasant girls, brought to these factories by brokers, who „rented“ the girls from their families in exchange for a flat fee paid to parents. Those contracts were usually for a duration of a few years, but many girls had never returned home, killed by unhuman working conditions and rampant tuberculosis. The girls had to work for up to 14 hours a day, in crowded rooms, filled with stinky steam from boiling silk cocoons. They were poorly fed, kept in closed, prison-like facilities, slept in overcrowded filthy dormitories. The life of village girls working in Meiji silk-mills was often described in novels, and later in films and TV programs. Their life became a symbol of exploitation of rural communities - the exploitation which enabled Japan to build its industrial and military power.

The removing of feudal restrictions ignited mass migration from the countryside and rapid urbanization. Explosively growing cities provided new chances for better life. This was accompanied by a quick growth in population size. During the twenty years between 1880 to 1900 Japanese population increased by ten million, reaching 45 million in 1900. The „new“ population had to be fed, and Japanese government put restrictions on the food imports, as foreign currency was badly needed for industrialization. Thus the pressure to increase productivity in agriculture was very strong. New ways of cultivation, new fertilizers and new crops were introduced. These processess were accompanied by increased economic disparities among villagers. Better off farmers, or those skillfull

¹⁵ Gordon op. cit.: 95.

and diligent ones were buying land from the poor and renting it to the landless, creating a huge army of tenants. In this way farmers began to exploit farmers within the same village, and a heartless loan shark became a part of village life. Solidarity within rural communities started to disappear and injustice and ruthless self-interest replaced old village ways of life. Japanese government considered peasants a main source of income, as land tax in 1870s and 1880s was making up 80% of revenue.¹⁶

To realize an ambitious program of creating a modern economy and building an industrial base, Japanese state needed huge funds. The government didn't have many options to choose from. These were times when governments could borrow money only from private banking institutions. Japanese government avoided borrowing money abroad, aware of the fate of Egypt, which became de facto a colony due to too many foreign loans. The only foreign loan, from English banks, was that of 1872, used to build the first section of a railway line between Tokyo and Yokohama. That loan came with strings attached – the railway was to be built with British companies supplying materials, know-how and workers, who were to be paid by Japanese according to much higher British standards.

The second large group of disadvantaged people after the farmers were the samurai, or *bushi* - particularly the lower ranking ones. They were dissatisfied with the Tokugawa rule, as they didn't have a chance to climb up the *bushi* hierarchy due to their family position on the ladder.

For that reason most of them eagerly supported the Meiji revolution. However, one of the first decisions of the new government was to reduce the rice stipends when the domains were abolished, and a few years later, in 1876, the government announced a compulsory conversion of stipends into the bonds. These decisions were justified from the economic point of view, but they meant abandonment to market forces a large group of loyal supporters.

In Meiji Japan the samurai were free to engage in any trade formerly forbidden. They could become craftsmen or merchants, but a very large part of their group was unemployed and living off their stipend. The reform was meant also to be an incentive for the samurai to start working and earning money. However, two and a half centuries of idleness made many of them unable to support themselves. Their lack of talent in business earned them an ironic nickname of *bushi shoho*, used later generally for people totally unfit for any business.

¹⁶ Ibid.: 95.

Government bonds had a face value of five to fourteen years of income, with interest between 5 and 7 percent. Overall, the annual income of most samurai, except of the former *daimyō*, fell by 10 to 75 percent.¹⁷ Many of the samurai soon lost their bonds in unsuccessful speculations. On top of that, they lost their pride and prestige – the government took away their right to wear swords. Only the soldiers and policemen could wear them.

The Meiji state had no use for the samurai anyway. The conscript army was being created, with peasants' sons as soldiers, trained in discipline and fierce loyalty. There weren't any place for the samurai in this new army.

Dissatisfied samurai began to rebel. Some of the rebellions, in 1876 in Chōshū, and in Kumamoto in the same year¹⁸ were quickly suppressed by government forces. Another one, in 1877 in Satsuma, with its charismatic leader Saigō Takamori, was much more difficult to deal with. The government fought off the rebels with the help of police forces, as a conscript army was still in the organization stage. The samurai from other former domains were paid by the government to fight the rebels, too. All together, the government forces consisted of 65 thousand people, of which 6 thousand were killed and 10 thousand wounded. On the rebel side – estimations are that 18 thousand lost their life or were wounded. Their leader, Saigō Takamori, committed *seppuku*.

Meiji government crushed the samurai rebellion, but the costs were very high. The government tried to reduce the budget deficit in 1878 by printing more money. This resulted in inflation, which only propelled the rise of deficit, due to the fall of the real value of land tax. In 1881 Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi introduced draconian fiscal and monetary politics. It included cutting state expenses by firing most foreign specialists, selling off unprofitable government industries, and returning to silver-backed currency (which meant stopping free printing of paper money). The result was the so-called Matsukata deflation. Prices of agricultural commodities fell by about 50 percent, which brought about a mass shift in land ownership, and created a dramatic rise in the number of tenant farmers. Now the peasants rebelled, and the best known uprising is the so-called Chichibu rebellion of Debtors or Poor Farmers parties. This shock therapy straightened up Japanese economy, but brought about devastating worsening of life for millions of Japanese.

When the Tokugawa rule was crumbling under its own inefficiencies, and peasants became the main victims of it, a Confucian scholar and poet Yasui

¹⁷ See Gordon op.cit.: 65.

¹⁸ See Jansen op. cit.: 369.

Sokken wrote a poem, which described the pitiful conditions of the Japanese countryside. About forty years later, Matsukata reforms made this poem relevant again:

Taxes and taxes; nothing to eat
and penniless peasants steal away.
Hunger and starvation riot in the valleys
The people are skin and bones.
Do you know, You in the palace, that the
timbre of the shamisen is only
wailing voices from the fields?¹⁹

Conclusions

Ian Buruma wrote: “Overconfidence, fanaticism, a shrill sense of inferiority, and a sometimes obsessive preoccupation with national status – these have all played their parts in the history of modern Japan (...). But one quality has stood out to serve Japan better than any other: the grace to make the best of defeat.”²⁰

Despite the turbulent Japanese history for the past 150 years, despite a painful defeat in WW II, the strategy chosen by Meiji leaders proved to be successful. It prevented Japan from being colonized by Western powers and let Japan to get its own colonies, however badly it sounds to us today. Japanese militarism, bringing untold sufferings to most of Asia and the trauma of American occupation to Japan, nevertheless forced Japanese industry to modernize for the war effort and enabled the postwar Japan’s quick adaptation to changed industrial environment, in effect creating a new role for Japan, that of an economic superpower. And always present – like a red thread – Japanese avoidance of the full opening of its economy to the world, let the Japanese to keep economic independence, despite its political reliance on the USA for the last half of a century. However, the social costs of Japanese successes were very high, and their repercussions are visible even now.

¹⁹ See Irokawa op. cit.: 77.

²⁰ Buruma, Ian 2003. *Inventing Japan*. New York: Random House: 7.

Olena Mykal

Development Aid in the EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Ensuring Peace and Stability by Economic Means

I. Introduction

For a decade Japan was the largest provider of ODA (Official Development Assistance) in the world. In the early 2000s due to economic difficulties the Japanese government started cutting its assistance budget and the US assumed the top position. In 2005 the European Commission accounted for more than 8% of the world ODA and Japan's contribution reached 11%. At the same time European Union (European Commission and Member States) granted ODA US\$65 billion, which accounted for 56% of the world ODA.¹ Together the European Union (EU) and Japan accounted for around 67% of world development aid. Nowadays, the EU and Japan are global-scale providers of the development aid. They enhance human security "for the benefit of all," and they share an interest in more efficient and closer cooperation in this area especially since 9/11 inasmuch as poverty is a link to insecurity and thus increase of terrorism.

The EU and Japan have a long history of exchange since the end of WWII – although not so vivid and strategic as the US-Japan military alliance or US-Europe connection via NATO – dating back to the establishment of relations in 1959. Within the framework of their relations they have been developing security dialogue, which refers to both discourse and joint activity cooperation between the EU and Japan in security area. In this context, "security" is treated from the respective European and Japanese security conceptualizations and their common security agenda.² Traditionally, Japan has been pursuing "comprehensive security" concept while Europe was regarded as a "civilian power," and both of them considered aid development component as a tool to provide security. In the late 1990s and early 2000s both of them adopted the human security doctrine with emphasis on "security for all."³ Therefore, for both actors

¹ Delegation of the European Commission to Japan, *EU Development Cooperation*. http://jpn.cec.eu.int/union/showpage_en_union.development.php.

² For more details on analytical framework see: Mykal, Olena 2007. "Japan and the European Union Security Dialogue: Invisible and Not Eye-Catching, but Sound and Comprehensive." Ph. D, dissertation. Tokyo: Waseda University.

³ For the security conceptualizations analysis see: Mykal, Olena 2006. "Japan-EU Security Relations in the 1990s: Defining the Spheres and Framework." *Journal of the Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies* November, 241-57; Mykal, Olena 2007.

security issues were and are not of pure military nature, but a complex of problems ranging from lack of natural resources to pandemics spread. It can be said that the EU-Japan security dialogue constitutes is a “safety net” of discourse and joint activities in certain areas of common interest such as crisis management, energy, environmental problems, development aid, etc. Taking into account foresaid, this article focuses on Japan and the European Union joint involvement and joint, concrete activities concerning the distribution and management of development aid in the world. In other words, the article will demonstrate what activities the EU and Japan have been engaged in concerning the development aid area throughout years, specifically since having revealed their interest to cooperate in this particular area in the 1980s. The article has a two-folded argument. First, there is a security dialogue between the EU and Japan in development aid area that despite its lack of visibility tends to expand and diversify. Second, although development aid is commonly perceived as an economic tool to assist developing countries, this article argues that the EU-Japan aid development dialogue has been securitized in order to provide security for the Japanese and European societies. The word “securitization” refers to the European Union-Japan joint activity aimed at preventing various threats to their societies, e.g. Gulf War that adversely affected oil prices and correspondingly world economy, or bird flue pandemic that threatens to undermine economic and societal mechanisms of actors. Therefore, this article does not apply the approach of securitization based on discourse analysis as proposed by Barry Buzan et al.⁴

To develop these arguments, the article proceeds in three parts. First, it examines the initiation of cooperation between the EU and Japan and the process of securitization of the development aid in the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, it illuminates the security dialogue on development aid in the mid 1990s. Finally, it studies the evolvement of the EU-Japan cooperation from the late 1990s until present and demonstrates how the security dialogue in development aid area has been expanding and deepening. Development aids to Afghanistan, Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Iraq are not examined insomuch they are meant to stop the war and prevent

“Security Policies of Japan and the European Union: Searching for Commonalities.” *EU Studies in Japan* 『日本EU学会年報』 27, 268-97 (forthcoming); 2001. “*For the <<security for all>>: An Action Plan for EU-Japan.*

⁴ See: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

its escalation. The cases examined in this article do not relate to war time, and are carried out in peace time as crisis or war prevention measures.

Moreover, the article traces the evolution of the EU-Japan development aid security dialogue from the time of revealing the interest to cooperate by both sides in the 1980s by examining mainly bilateral documents. With regard to scholarly works on the EU-Japan relations, it should be noted that the main focus has been placed on the analysis of the EU development aid policy and its implications for Japan and vice versa.⁵ So far, it seems that there has been no research conducted specifically on the EU-Japan joint development aid policies, particularly in the security context.

II. The Cold War Period: Securitization of Development Aid

Europe and Japan have longstanding traditions of providing development assistance. While in the 1950s and early 1990s Europe was concentrating more on Africa, Japan's ODA was directed principally to Asian countries. The origin and nature of the development aid have also differed so far. Europe provided the aid due to the fact of being the center of many former powers that had had overseas colonies. Later, during and after the decolonization process, European aid had and has more to do with control and limitation of the flow of people from Africa and other regions to Europe (refugee issue) and responsibility for the colonial past.

Unlike Europe, at that time Japan did not have colonies and began to provide aid along with paying reparations up to 1976. Since 1977 Japan provided assistance to improve the quality life for other Asian countries and at the same time to ensure the Japanese image of a peaceful country, to pursue its economic interests, and to secure import and export flows that are crucial for Japan's survival. Besides, as its economic power grew, Japan faced higher US expectations for contributions. To support the war in Vietnam, Washington urged Tokyo in the 1960s to increase economic aid to non-communist countries in Asia, namely Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the countries involved in the Mekong river project.⁶ Japanese portrayed its growing aid to the region as an indication of support for the US. In addition, Japan preferred not to use defense spending as its principal

⁵ See for instance: Hiroshi Okuma 2005. "New Directions in Japan's Official Development Assistance." (in.) Takako Ueta and Eric Remacle (eds.) *Japan and Enlarged Europe: Partners in Global Governance*, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 155-172.

⁶ Orr, Robert M. Jr. 1998. "The Aid Factor in US-Japan Relations." *Asian Survey* 28, no.

7 (July), 744-745, cited in Ming Wan 2001. *Japan between Asia and the West: Economic power and strategic partnership*, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe: 28.

form of international contribution. A report to the prime minister by the Foreign Economic Policy Study Group in April 1980 suggested that to meet international expectations for contributions Japan should focus on economics, diplomacy, culture, science, and technology rather than “hasty expansion of direct military cooperation.”⁷ As Susan Pharr noted, in the late 1970s Japan used the concept of “comprehensive security” to legitimize “substitution” of development aid, strategic aid, and debt relief for defense spending.⁸ Moreover, by increasing the volume of development assistance Japan offered strategic aid to countries bordering with areas of conflict, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Thailand, which were strategically important to the West in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Japan’s strategic aid was meant to support the US strategic objectives.⁹ Hence, as we can see, Japan pursued comprehensive security, which encompassed among others economic tool to deal with the security issues.

With the end of the Cold War, the European Union and Japanese development assistance has been based increasingly on political and security priorities, which resulted in adopting a prescriptive approach by the EU and Japan on development. Japan’s ODA charters of 1992 and 2003 put security concerns at the top of the issue of development assistance extension.¹⁰ In the EU, the trend to securitize aid became especially obvious with the Cotonou agreement of 2002.¹¹ However, as the analysis below will demonstrate, the European and Japanese development policies have been aimed at securing their respective positions in the world even from earlier stages than the above-mentioned documents.

At multilateral level Japan and Europe cooperation in development area dates back to March 1960 when Japan joined the Development Assistance

⁷ Foreign Economic Policy Study Group of the Policy Research Council 1980. *Taigai Keizai Seisaku Kenkyū Gurūpu Hōkokusho* [report by the Foreign Economic Policy Study Group]. *Seikai Keizai Hyōron* 24, No. 6 (June): 54.

⁸ Pharr, Susan 1993. “Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing.” (in.) Gerald Curtis (ed.) *Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe: 243.

⁹ Inada, Juichi 1989. “Japan’s Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 18, No. 3, 399-414; Dennis T. Yasutomo 1986. *The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

¹⁰ See: Japan’s ODA Charters of 1992 and 2003.

¹¹ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler 1999. *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London and New York: Routledge: 136.

Group (DAG), and to 1961, when DAG was reorganized becoming the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC). Japan thus joined it as one of the founding member countries. There was some opposition among the European states to Japan's joining the OECD, but due to the US lobbying, Japan succeeded in joining the organization.

On bilateral level the cooperation between the EC and Japan started in the 1980s in the form of joint financing of a number of development projects.¹² Aid development issues were also frequently on the agenda of the European Commission-Japanese ministers meetings and high level consultations.¹³ In 1987 the Commission expressed its wish "to extend cooperation with Japan in the development field."¹⁴ In 1990 they were supposed to hold "separate talks on development assistance to discuss concrete possibilities for cooperation or coordination."¹⁵

2.1. Involvement of Japan in Assistance to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

The end of the Cold War relentlessly revealed – from the shadow of global USSR-US rivalry and under a new angle – the problems of poverty in developing countries. However, the first joint project between the EU and Japan concerned not Africa or Asia, but Europe. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in response to changes in the world, the development aid was granted to areas where cooperation was regarded as necessity in order to increase the efficiency of available resources and their distribution.¹⁶ Emergence of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as free from the USSR and democratized nations was accompanied by serious

¹² European Commission 1985. *Visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone to the Commission*, DN: MEMO/85/100, 17 July.

¹³ European Commission 1987. *Meeting Between the Commission and Japanese Ministers*, DN: MEMO/86/155, 10 December; European Commission 1987. *Commission-Japan High level Consultations 9-10 July 1987, Tokyo*, DN: MEMO/87/79, 7 July.

¹⁴ European Commission 1987. *Commission-Japan High level Consultations 9-10 July 1987, Tokyo*. DN: MEMO/87/79, 7 July.

¹⁵ European Commission 1989. *High-Level Consultations between the European Commission and Japan*. DN: IP/89/848, 10 November.

¹⁶ European Commission 1989. *Community-Japan Relations*. DN: MEMO/89/60, 8 November; European Commission; European Commission 1989. *EEC-Japan Relations*, DN: MEMO/89/32, 2 June; European Commission 1990. *Meeting between the Commission and Japanese Ministers*, DN: MEMO/90/20, 28 May.

challenges to economic and security stability for the Western Europe due to the economic backwardness and political instability of the former. Moreover, the West was fraught with serious flow of people from CEE. Therefore, it was concluded that immediate preventive measures were necessary. Japan became involved immediately in the G24 (Group of 24)¹⁷ process to assist the newly-democratized countries of CEE by providing financial, management, training and technology support. In addition, Japan as a shareholder¹⁸ initiated establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which aim was to build market economies and democracies. The above clearly demonstrates that the development aid provided by the EU and Japan to CEE was in fact connected with their security considerations and regarded necessary to secure stable situation in Europe and, correspondingly, in the world. In other words, Japan provided assistance because it was deeply interested in preserving peace in Europe insomuch as a significant share of its trade and investments was with European countries. Moreover, joint collaboration of Europe and Japan on this project illustrates the fact of cooperation, and of security dialogue between them that was aimed at tackling the problem of CEE countries' integration into the world economy, and thereby preserving stability of the liberal market system.

2.2. Gulf War Crisis in European and Japanese Development Policies

Apart from growing presence and involvement of Japan in European development programs as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and necessity to build market economy in Central and Eastern Europe, Japan and the European Commission (EC) became active players during the Gulf War Crisis. In 1990, the EC made two offers of emergency aid to refugees totalling US\$66 million and it also pledged US\$2 billion aid to Jordan, Turkey and Egypt to support their role in maintaining the UN sanctions against Iraq. Acting in parallel, Japan, "heavily dependent of Gulf oil and

¹⁷ Group of 24 was created in July 1989 to coordinate assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. The G24 group consists of 24 nations including the 15 members of the European Union (EU), Japan, the United States and Canada. International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also take part.

<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/resources/publications/annual/2001/pdf/200114.pdf>

¹⁸ European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2007, *EBRD: Investment of Choice*, November 2007. Japan's share is 8.6% of contributions.
<http://www.ebrd.com/markets/investor/choice.pdf>

therefore on the willingness to secure the independence and competitive pricing of that oil, increased its pledge for economic assistance from US\$1 to US\$2 billion to those three countries and separate US\$2 billion coverage for the specific defense implications of the Gulf crisis.”¹⁹ Working in parallel, but coordinating their policies, Europe and Japan facilitated successful management of the crisis. In 1991 and 1992, there were consultations on development aid between Japan and the EC.²⁰ As in the previous case, that shows that both sides applied development aid for security needs and also that they were coordinating their activities.

2.3. State of Bilateral Security Dialogue on Development Assistance

Still, at the bilateral level, as the European Commission acknowledged, “until 1991 relations in development hardly existed, and were re-launched during the EC Commission President Delor visit to Japan in 1991 and by the signature of Joint Declaration.”²¹ The EC expressed its desire for Japan to make “a greater contribution to the international aid effort, so that a fair sharing of the financial burden was achieved.”²² The EC also noted that Japan should devote a greater part of its aid to the least developed countries (LDCs). It is interesting to note that the Commission observed “*a certain complementarity*” between the European Community (EC) and Japan aid development policies.²³ In fact, the EC had a strong and well-established presence in Africa, Middle East, Central and South America whereas Japan had tended to concentrate on Asia.²⁴ Thus they could benefit from each other’s expertise, including possibly joint cooperation on South Africa. For this purpose a series of meetings between the Commission and the Japanese authorities began to define in the first place a common ground between each other’s policies. In the early 1990s, the EC reiterated the necessity to increase Japan’s share in the financial burden and to strengthen coordination so as to make effective the policy reforms adopted by many

¹⁹ Frans Andriessen 1990. *Speech by Vice-President of the European Commission Mr. Andriessen at the EC-Japan Journalists Conference*. Brighton, 20 September.

²⁰ European Commission 1992. *European – Japan Relations*. DN: MEMO/92/9, 9 March;

²¹ European Commission 1992. “New European Commission Guidelines for Relations with Japan (A Consistent and Global Approach – A review of the Community’s relations with Japan (Communication of the Commission to the Council).” *Europe© Documents*. No. 1779/80 dated 6 June: 10.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., emphasis added.

²⁴ Ibid.

developing countries, as well as to develop further collaboration aiming at more operational framework, possibly including co-financing.²⁵

In 1992 the European Parliament adopted resolution on relations with Japan where it gave special importance to the necessity to integrate the Central and Eastern European economies into the world economy.²⁶ In this view, the Japanese assistance and expertise were regarded as significant and critical, not only for the G-24 process, but as discussed below, for a range of other multilateral projects. In other words, the EU and Japan within their security dialogue started coordinating development aid resources' distribution, which, given then trade wars, was a significant achievement that met their interests and concerns. This also illustrates that the EC and Japan were interested in avoiding pursuing overlapping policies. As to co-financing, it can be pointed out that although there were no purely bilateral projects, nevertheless, as the cases above and below show, there was co-financing within international, multilateral institutions. Moreover, it can be argued that due to the complex, multilayered issues, such as, for example, stabilization of situation in CEE countries, multilateral level was more appropriate for the EU and Japan security dialogue because the projects there met their common security concerns and simultaneously allowed both sides to avoid talks on trade, and thereby emphasize the points of common understanding and shared views.

2.4. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union

In parallel with joint activity to support the process of economic and political transition in Central and Eastern Europe, the EC and Japan were also working closely to assist the reform efforts of the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former USSR.²⁷ The collapse of the USSR brought transformations and induced more instability to the world inasmuch as the former republics of the USSR were in economic recession, most of them lacking the experience of conducting foreign policy, and more importantly, majority of them possessed diversified military complexes and arsenals.²⁸

²⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁶ European Parliament 1992. *Resolution on Political Relations between the European Community and Japan (Resolution A3-0160/92)*. 9 July.

²⁷ 1991. *Second EC-Japan Summit. Joint Press Statement*. London, 4 July.

²⁸ In the former Soviet Union among 15 republics Ukraine and Belorussia had an experience of realization foreign policy. However, it was limited to the UN structures. After the end of the Second World War according to agreement reached at series of conferences establishing the UN in 1944-45, Ukraine and Belorussia as the republics that suffered mostly from Nazi occupation and atrocities, were granted the UN founding

To give one example, Ukraine as an independent state possessed the third largest in the world arsenal – after the US and Russia – of nuclear weapons and its army accounted for around one million troops. Under such circumstances, urgent comprehensive measures were needed, of which the development policy aid was one of the most essential tools. Thus, in a month after the collapse of the USSR, in January 1992, the US hosted the conference in Washington on assistance to NIS. It established five working groups on technical assistance, medical supplies, food, energy and shelter, which initiated coordination assistance among donors. Moreover, the EU from the first days after the collapse of USSR provided consultation assistance on democratization and conducting foreign policy.²⁹ Shortly, in May 1992, the EC hosted a conference in Lisbon, and in October 1992 Japan hosted conference in Tokyo on assistance to NIS. As a result of the three-round conference – notably in the US, Europe and Japan – it was agreed that the aid coordination would be made for each individual country through a consultative group chaired by the World Bank. Specifically, Japan was to provide first technical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid and assistance to smooth trade and economic activities.³⁰ The EC was also active in the NIS democratization process. While these were not purely bilateral measures, it is important to note four points. First, the trilateral coordination was not led or directed by the US unilaterally. Second, the aid activities were placed in a security context from the beginning. Third, Japan and Europe coordinated their policy activities as allies and major strategic partners. Finally, by coordinating the aid policies in order to secure international environment, the EU and Japan were acting within the framework of their bilateral security dialogue.

To sum up, the EU-Japan cooperation in development aid area began in the 1980s, but was re-launched in 1991 given new impetus with the visit of President of the EC Jacques Delor and signing of the Hague Declaration.³¹ As demonstrated above, the securitization of development aid had been the case from the start of the EU and Japan's involvement in joint projects. Hence, common activities undertaken in the development area by Europe

and member states status.

²⁹ From the talk with Lord William Wallace, who was invited to Ukraine with other scholars and politicians to consult on foreign policy in December 1991. Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University, 13 November 2006.

³⁰ 1992. *Diplomatic Bluebook*. Chapter 3, Section 4.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1992/1992-3-4.htm>

³¹ For details see: Footnote 2, Mykal, Olena op. cit., Chapters 2-3.

and Japan regarding CEE countries' integration into world economy, the settlement of Gulf crisis, and assistance to NIS countries demonstrate that both actors provided assistance aid guided by the security concerns. They were coordinating their policies to avoid their overlapping and to improve their efficiency. The coordination took place both at multilateral and bilateral levels. Due to the scope of the above problems, multilateral level was considered more efficient to tackle the problems. Moreover, it should be especially stressed that although there were trade disputes between the EU and Japan at that time, it nevertheless did not prevent them from acting globally as allies and strategic partners tackling global problems by the means of development aid, which was dictated by global concerns. This shows that there was in fact a security dialogue between the EU and Japan, due to their mutual global security considerations.

III. The Mid 1990s: Enlarging the Scope of Activity

By the mid 1990s Japan and the EU were exchanging information on concrete humanitarian aid projects.³² There were also ongoing discussions on strengthening their cooperation in the area of development cooperation. Within this context, both sides were particularly anxious of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where they were willing to improve cooperation on food security policies, human resources development, capacity building and support to education and health policies.³³

According to the estimations of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), unless the progress is accelerated, there would still be some 680 million hungry people in the world by 2010, more than 250 million of whom would be in sub-Saharan Africa.³⁴ These estimations along with the need to eliminate hunger and malnutrition and to achieve sustainable food security for all people, led to the organization of the World Food Summit within the UN framework in November 1996. The EU and Japan coordinated their activities in the preparation of the summit and thereby food security area became one more issue of their bilateral security agenda.³⁵ Therefore, the aid development security dialogue was extended to include wider geographical scope of actions, such as Africa, in addition to Europe and Middle East (Gulf crisis). Moreover, the dialogue was expanded also in regard to the targeted tasks. Along with economic, trade,

³² 1997. *6th EU-Japan Summit. Joint Press Statement*. The Hague, June.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ World Food Summit: http://www.fao.org/wfs/main_en.htm.

³⁵ 2007. *5th EU-Japan Summit. Joint Press Statement*, Tokyo, 30 September.

military estimations that had been motives of granting assistance in previous cases, cooperation on Africa was an example of preventing humanitarian catastrophe and illegal migration because of a simple reason, namely the lack of food.

In 1997, the EU and Japan made a supposed “breakthrough” by focusing their development assistance on the countries that were pursuing sound economic policies and political reforms within the framework of an integrated approach, which took into account the greatest development, economic and social needs.³⁶ This decision was viewed as a necessary step to sustain efficiency. However, it can be said that the shift in providing assistance to poor countries by linking and subordinating it to political and economic reforms occurred within an increasingly insistent security discourse and in the face of the emergence of the problems of a new type. As Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler admit, the EU development policy has an increasingly prescriptive approach, together with the intrusion of political and security priorities into development policies.³⁷ In case of Japan, it is sufficient to refer to the ODA charter, which states that “the objectives of Japan's ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity.”³⁸ Close connection between eradication of poverty and reforms constitute some kind of insurance for the EU and Japan, as well as other donors, that developing countries will pursue exactly the policies that are expected to. It provides, on the one hand, a security and guarantee for the donors that developing countries would move in the “appropriate” direction, and on the other hand, it becomes both a challenge and an assurance for the developing countries to choose exactly that way. It is a challenge because the developing countries can not choose another way without losing assistance, and it is a certain assurance that by choosing the donors' way they are guaranteed the assistance. Similar problem will be disused below regarding the Doha round of WTO. Nevertheless, whilst Bretherton and Vogler argue that these policies constitute a prescriptive approach, this article will demonstrate below that they are in fact more of obligatory nature, due to the EU and Japan's security concerns and noticeable linkage between the security and development aid as a tool to provide the former.

³⁶ 1997. *6th EU-Japan Summit. Joint Press Statement*, The Hague, June.

³⁷ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler op. cit.: 136.

³⁸ 2003. *ODA Charter*. August.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf>.

Despite the “breakthrough” arrangements not much has been done jointly at the bilateral level due to the Asian crisis and a slowdown of Japanese economy in the 1990s. However, even under those severe conditions, Japan remained the largest state provider of ODA notwithstanding its 10% cutback in 1998. In 1999, the EU repeated that in the development assistance it was important that the EU and Japan as leading donors undertake *concrete cooperation projects* for efficient and effective implementation of assistance to developing countries.³⁹ In this context, the EU welcomed new Miyazawa initiative, also known as New Initiative to Overcome Asian Currency Crisis, which was designed to enhance the access to the international markets by the Asian countries.⁴⁰

To summarize, in a comparatively short period of the mid 1990s, the EU-Japan development aid security dialogue underwent a very important transformation of linking the development policies with political and security concerns of donors, not only on their respective individual agendas, but also at bilateral level. Food safety area and corresponding measures were added to the EU-Japan security dialogue agenda. Moreover Japan began its involvement in African development. These facts clearly indicate widening of the EU-Japan security dialogue in the development aid area.

IV. The Late 1990s – Mid 2000s: Multiplied and Multilayered Agenda of Global Challenges

4.1. Millennium Development Goals and the EU-Japan Cooperation Plan

At the end of the 1990s, the EU and Japan admitted that they were discussing and repeatedly placing on their agenda the aid development issues, but still they did not agree on formulating “concrete projects” at the bilateral level.⁴¹ To this end, both sides agreed to cooperate closely together to promote development and reduce poverty in the regions that lag behind economically. The EU and Japan stressed the importance of aid

³⁹ European Commission 1999. *Commission Working Document on Japan*. Brussels, SEC(1999) 524 Final, 21 April, emphasis added.

⁴⁰ 1999. *8th EU-Japan Summit, Joint Press Statement*, Bonn, 20 June.

⁴¹ See for instance: European Commission 1999. *Commission Working Document on Japan*. Brussels, SEC(1999) 524 Final, 21 April; Yōhei Kōno 2000. *Seeking a Millennium Partnership: New Dimensions in Japan-Europe Cooperation Policy*. Speech by Foreign Minister Yōhei Kōno, French Institute of Foreign Relations, Paris, 13 January; 2000. *9th EU-Japan Summit. Joint Conclusions*. Tokyo, 19 July.

policy dialogues to promote mutual understanding of aid practices and methods, and to seek further opportunities to foster aid cooperation. In 2000 Japan was ready to send Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) staff to the European Commission, and both sides were discussing the details of this matter.⁴² Although it is hard to prove, nevertheless it can be speculated that there might have been some connection between intensified EU-Japan security dialogue on development aid and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Thus, in September 2000 the UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Development Goals that are the common grounds for enhancing development policies for the international community. These goals included: 1) Eradication of Extreme Poverty and Hunger; 2) Achievement of Universal Primary Education; 3) Promotion of Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women; 4) Reduction of Child Mortality; 5) Improvement of Maternal Health; 6) Combat of HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Other Diseases; 7) Assurance of Environmental Sustainability; and 8) Development of a Global Partnership for Development.⁴³ Within the scope of goal eight concerning global partnership for development, it is envisaged to:

1. Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory, includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – nationally and internationally;
2. Address the least developed countries' special needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction;
3. Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing States;
4. Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems through national and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long term;
5. In cooperation with the developing countries, develop decent and productive work for youth;
6. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access

⁴² 2000. *9th EU-Japan Summit, Joint Conclusions*, Tokyo, 19 July.

⁴³ United Nations Website: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.

- to affordable essential drugs in developing countries;
- 7. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies – especially information and communications technologies.⁴⁴

A close examination of the EU-Japan security dialogue on development aid shows that both sides have been cooperating on multiples targets, to mention only the major ones: rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory trade and financial system, and tariff- and quota-free access for the LDCs, as well as combating diseases. Thus in order to cope with these problems as specified by the ambitious MDGs by 2015, there was a need for not only bilateral but to much greater extent multilateral approach, which could already have been observed in the EU and Japan's involvement, for example, in the Doha round of WTO and later in handling the diseases (see below). In addition to and in parallel with MDGs, the European Union and Japan elaborated their own agenda dictated by the global needs, necessities and previous experience of collaboration, which was articulated in *An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation* of 2001 (Action Plan):

“...closer co-operation is a true necessity. As global partners, accounting for major share of world GDP, and the world’s largest donors of development assistance, we have a special responsibility to the global community. With this in mind, we will intensify our efforts to promote sustainable development and to reduce poverty, while striving to make our assistance more efficient and better directed to those most in need.”⁴⁵

Moreover, Europe and Japan stated that their overall cooperation rests “*on shared global responsibilities with a view to promotion human security for the benefit of all.*”⁴⁶ In this regards Action Plan contained five concrete steps of aid policy coordination between the EU and Japan.⁴⁷ The first concerned coordination of Japanese and European policies “in the

⁴⁴ UN Millennium Project Website:

<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/goals02.htm>.

⁴⁵ 2001. *An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation*. Brussels, December.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/action0112.html>.

⁴⁶ Ibid., emphasis added.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

preparation, implementation and monitoring of sector-wide approaches, as appropriate, in countries and sectors of mutual concern. The EU and Japan decided to promote exchange of information and cooperation in order to cope with infectious and parasitic diseases, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, poliomyelitis and malaria.⁴⁸ That was actually the first such decision in the area concerning diseases in the EU-Japan security dialogue. The decision was undertaken due to the threat of epidemic, dangerous and non-treatable diseases, and perhaps also due to the stipulations of the MDGs on combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Both sides began to be more actively involved and cooperate in tackling pandemic especially after the outbreak of SARS in China in November 2002, and Avian influenza in Korea in December 2003 (see below). Moreover, in the same 2003, the EU and Japan recognized the need to closely cooperate on improving access to medicines in developing countries which demonstrates broadening of the dialogue.⁴⁹

The second step was to conduct joint comparison and assessment, when appropriate, of each other's development policies and programs in order to increase effectiveness and improve monitoring. The EU and Japan agreed to hold consultations at expert level, joint organization of seminars and symposia, and to dispatch joint assessment missions.⁵⁰ Although these measures and procedures of cooperation were new for the EU-Japan dialogue, nevertheless, they were within their coordination of development aid policies. These measures illustrate that both sides expected the security dialogue to deepen.

The third step concerned already introduced practice of exchange of personnel between JICA and relevant institutions of the European Commission including aid administration in the EU Member States.⁵¹ These exchanges were aimed to improve mutual understanding of policies and procedures between the EU and Japan. The new policy of exchange also proves that there was a mutual interest in further developing their dialogue.

The fourth step envisaged joint cooperation in multilateral fora to increase the effectiveness of international financial institutions' support to

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ 2003. *12th EU-Japan Summit*. Athens, 1-2 May.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/joint0305.html>.

⁵⁰ 2001. *An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation*. Brussels, December.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/action0112.html>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

developing countries, in particular when the fight against poverty was concerned.⁵² This type of cooperation in multilateral institutions was new neither for the EU nor for Japan, but they admitted officially for the first time the necessity to make their policies coherent in those institutions. This again shows the interest of both partners in deepening and intensifying the cooperation “for the benefit of all,” which corresponds to the human security approach of both Japan and the EU.

Lastly, the fifth common step was cooperation on African development. The EU and Japan recognized the significance of each other’s policies in Africa. Since the late 1990s, the issue of Africa on the EU-Japan security dialogue has been of special importance insofar Japan’s engagement in African development had been growing, which was welcomed by the EU (see below).

Clearly, Action Plan introduced new area (combating diseases) and articulated already previously explored activities (coordination, joint comparison and assessment of projects, exchange of personnel, cooperation on multilateral institutions, African development) in their security dialogue on development assistance. Action Plan is less ambitious and less ambiguous when compared with the MDGs, but owing to its moderateness, it seems more feasible to implement. The newly introduced concrete measures on aid development were a needed step that broadened the scope of activity to include both bi- and multilateral levels, and deepened the dialogue by introducing the new area for cooperation. In other words, the articulation of new activities in Action Plan manifests the deepening of the dialogue and enlarging of the scope of the European Union and Japan’s involvement in joint developmental projects at bilateral and multilateral levels. As Poul Nielson, the European Commissioner responsible for Development and Humanitarian Aid, admitted, “Japan is a key player in global development cooperation and the European Union wants very much to have a closer relationship, a closer dialogue with Japan in this field.”⁵³

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Poul Nielson (European Commissioner responsible for Development and Humanitarian Aid) 2001. *Fighting Poverty and Promoting Development: the EU Strategy*. A speech at the Japan National Press Club, Tokyo, 23 January. http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/speech_en_Speech%2001/01.php.

4.2. African Development in the EU-Japan Security Dialogue

Europe was traditionally involved in African affairs as a dominant player since some of the EU member states had been colonial powers. However, within the 1990s, the situation changed. In 1992, the European Commission admitted “certain complementarity” between the European and Japanese aid distributions, specifying that Asia was a traditional focus of Japanese ODA, whilst the EU had targeted ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific). In 2001, the European Union and Japan admitted the significance of each other’s policies in Africa.⁵⁴ In other words, the EU acknowledged active involvement of Japan in Africa.

Japan began to actively pursue African direction since the early 1990s with the initiation of Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process tackling three basic objectives: 1) to raise awareness of the African development issue; 2) to promote a spirit of ownership⁵⁵ of the development process and partnership in the international community; and 3) to extend that partnership, especially through Asia-Africa cooperation.⁵⁶ As a Japanese diplomat admitted, “[w]e can say that many Asian countries, in particular ASEAN, have been receiving aid for many years. Now these countries start to take off independently themselves. So, the focus will be on other regions... Africa.”⁵⁷ Thus, TICAD I was held in October 1993, with the EU as a participant.⁵⁸ In October 1998, Japan held TICAD II, again with the EU also joining it.⁵⁹ In addition, it should be mentioned that the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) has closely cooperated with Japan on various projects through TICAD. UNIDO realizes projects funded by Japan to promote investment and technology promotion from Asian to African countries. It operates the Asia-Africa Investment and Technology Promotion Center (AAITPC), also known as the Hippaos Centre in Malaysia. In 2003, UNIDO and the EU signed agreement on cooperation entitled the Financial and Administrative

⁵⁴ An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation, Brussels 2001.

⁵⁵ Ownership implies responsibility for own development by developing countries.

⁵⁶ United Nations Industrial Development Organization, *UNIDO at TICAD III*.

<http://www.unido.org/doc/18168>.

⁵⁷ 2006. Interview, Delegation of Japan to the EU, July.

⁵⁸ MOFA, TICAD I Outline: Tokyo International Conference on African Development <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/outline.html>.

⁵⁹ The EU participated in the TICAD II and was represented by Athanassios Theodorakis, Deputy Director General for Development in the European Commission (DG VIII). See: The EU at TICAD II:

http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news_en_newsobj523.php.

Framework Agreement or FAFA, which facilitates the funding by the European Commission of UNIDO programs.⁶⁰ Such cooperation framework where Japan and the EU fund the UN programs, as in this case, illustrates their involvement in various multinational projects. Whereas such type of collaboration is not seen at the bilateral level, nevertheless it does not diminish or denies the EU-Japan cooperation.

In December 2001 the EU and Japan decided to cooperate on Africa on the basis of the guidelines of Tokyo Agenda for Action adopted at the Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD II) held in October 1998 and on the basis of the guidelines of Cotonou Agreement of June 2000.⁶¹ They intended to strengthen support for efforts by African regional organizations (including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Southern African Development Community) and African countries to prevent and resolve conflicts in the region. In this context, the EU and Japan intended to closely cooperate in implementing the G8 Initiatives for Conflict Prevention issued at Miyazaki (2000) and Rome (2001).⁶² Needless to say, such concrete coordination of policies was a significant tool of making the aid measures effective, of avoiding overlaps and of securing or restoring peace in Africa. It also demonstrates the fact of deepening and widening the security dialogue at the EU-Japan level.

At the 2006 EU-Japan summit, the leaders “stressed the importance of continuing and promoting aid policy dialogue between Japan and the EU.”⁶³ The EU recalled the importance of the EU’s new Africa Strategy and welcomed Japan’s role in TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development). Both the EU and Japan admitted that they wished to cooperate more closely on African development and that they also positively evaluated each other’s efforts in this area.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ United Nations Industrial Development Organization, UNIDO and EC sign *agreement to strengthen partnership and reduce red tape*. Brussels Belgium, 23 October, 2003. <http://www.unido.org/doc/18168>.

⁶¹ See: 2001. *MOFA, TICAD Ministerial-level Meeting (Overview)*. 6 December. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/min01/overview.html>

⁶² 2001. *An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation* (Part 1. Specific Regional Issues). EU-Japan Summit, Brussels, December. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/action0112.html>.

⁶³ 2006. *15th Japan-EU Summit. Joint Press Statement*. Tokyo, 24 April.

⁶⁴ 2006. Interviews with the representatives of the EC Delegation (May-June), Academy of Defence of Japan, JICA (January, March).

Proceeding from above, we can conclude that Japan became for the European Union an important partner in cooperation on African development. Here their security dialogue is held at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Acknowledging each other's efforts, they work jointly towards realization of development policies. All above also shows a growing mutual engagement and diversification of channels of cooperation, e.g. through TICAD, UNIDO, EU-Japan and other frameworks.

4.3. Combating Pandemics

Apart from developing cooperation on African problems, the EU-Japan security dialogue has developed to include other issues. Thus, in the outbreak of SARS at the end of 2002, following Action Plan arrangements, the EU and Japan agreed to promote exchange of information and cooperation to cope with SARS.⁶⁵ The practice showed that rapid initial responses, including grass-roots level, were the key to effective containment of avian and pandemic influenza. In this respect Europe and Japan have continued cooperation to strengthen the global partnership based on, *inter alia*, the results of the organized by Japan and World Health Organization (WHO) Tokyo conference and the Beijing pledging conference. Japan and the EU have also fully supported the activities of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Moreover, they have confirmed the importance of international responses such as strengthening of the GOARN (Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network) and voluntary early application of the revised International Health Regulations.⁶⁶ European and Japanese policy coordination and substantial financing of pandemic prevention measures have taken place in the multilateral fora, which thereby widen their mutual involvement in developmental projects. This is reasonable inasmuch as spread of diseases does not acknowledge state borders or any other physical limits. Moreover, the EU and Japan's joint activity at the multilateral fora proves that they work for the enlargement of frameworks of the security for all.

4.5. Doha Development Agenda

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, along with attempts to coordinate aid policies to assist developing countries at the bilateral level, within the

⁶⁵ 2003. *12th Japan-EU Summit. Joint Press Statement*. Athens, 1-2 May.

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/japan/sum05_03/state.htm.

⁶⁶ 2006. *15th EU-Japan Summit. Joint Press Statement*. 24 April 2006.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/joint0604.html>.

WTO framework, the EU and Japan began to be involved in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in November 2001. They agreed together with other developed countries to put forward a preferential market access initiative for the least developed WTO members to extend and implement tariff-free and quota-free treatment for almost all products originating in the LDCs.⁶⁷ In other words, the intent of the Doha round is to make trade rules fairer for developing countries.⁶⁸ The DDA complies with the MDGs task on open trade system and tariff- and quota-free access for the LDCs exports. However, the main clashes and divisions on opening the markets for food and agricultural products from developing countries exist between the EU, the US and Japan on one side, and the major developing countries led and represented mainly by the G4 bloc (China, India, Brazil, and South Africa) on the other, that hampers further talks. Whilst the EU, Japan and the US prefer to extend the development aid to developing countries, the latter calls for fairer and more equal access to the markets of developed countries.

Moreover, in 2000 the EU and Japan adopted joint statement on WTO, in which they stressed the importance for all countries of rule-based trading system, as well as compatibility between trade policy on the one hand and sustainable development on the other.⁶⁹ This statement has had a far reaching impact not only on the EU, Japan themselves and their bilateral practices, but also on developing countries that are to comply with sustainable development requirements. Likewise, it also indicated the linkage of ODA with political and economic reforms (the 1997 EU-Japan Summit), as well as with the environmental issues.

In 2004, the EU and Japan jointly reiterated the importance of achieving the progress in the Doha Development Agenda and called on all WTO members to *show flexibility* and make further movement on substance to contribute to achieving the Doha Agenda *for the benefit of all* WTO members.⁷⁰ In 2006 at the bilateral level, Japan and the EU recognized aid effectiveness as an important field for improved donors' cooperation and for promoting better implementation of ODA projects and programs in

⁶⁷ 2000. *EU-Japan Ministerial Meeting, EU-Japan Joint Statement on the WTO*. DN: IP/00/15, 11 January; 2000. *9th EU-Japan Summit, Statement on WTO*. Tokyo, 19 July.

⁶⁸ See: Oxfam International:

<http://www.oxfam.org/en/programs/campaigns/maketradefair/>.

⁶⁹ 2000. *9th EU-Japan Summit, Joint Statement on WTO*. Tokyo, 18 July.

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/eu/summit/joint0007_3.html.

⁷⁰ See: 2004. *13th Japan-EU Summit, Joint Press Statement*, Tokyo, 22 June; 2006. *15th Japan-EU Summit, Joint Press Statement*. 24 April, emphasis added.

partner countries.⁷¹ Nowadays, Japan and the EU are exploring ways to cooperate “more closely within the OECD-DAC and other multilateral fora to strengthen strategic tools for fighting poverty.”⁷²

To summarize, development policies of the EU and Japan have been closely connected and intertwined with trade and economic issues. In this context, it is natural that the EU and Japan have cooperated in multilateral frameworks. Opening domestic markets to agricultural products from developing countries has been an issue of true security nature for both the EU and Japan, but especially for the latter. On one hand, both partners strive to promote free trade without barriers, and on the other hand, their markets are closed to large extent for the developing states, which can be explained by their intention to secure themselves and to protect possible vulnerability of their food markets. Hence, the EU-Japan joint actions on the DDA illustrate the interconnected and shared nature of their policies and attitudes, and also their mutual understanding of this problem. Therefore, it can be argued that the EU and Japan security dialogue in this area has been deepened.

V. Conclusion

The subject-matter of this article concerns the Japan and the European Union’s joint involvement and concrete activities in the area of the distribution and management of international development aid.

The article demonstrated that the Japan-EU bilateral security dialogue with regards to development aid actually dates back to the 1980s. The dialogue was given new impetus with the visit of the President of the European Commission Jacques Delor to Japan and signing of the Hague Political Declaration in 1991. The first project undertaken jointly by the EU and Japan concerned development assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries to stabilize the situation in Europe. Next, both sides coordinated their development policies during the Gulf War Crisis of 1990-1991. Simultaneously, right after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Japan and the EU collaborated in providing assistance to the NIS to prevent conflicts and non-controllable situation with the arms proliferation. Though within multilateral structures, these cases of cooperation demonstrate the securitized nature of the development aid in foreign policies of the EC and Japan. In other words, the article showed that the development aid issue was already securitized at the early stage of the EU-Japan cooperation in

⁷¹ 2006. *15 EU-Japan Summit. Joint Press Statement*. 24 April.

⁷² Ibid.

this area. Moreover, the article illustrated that the EU and Japan were acting as major players and strategic partners from an early involvement in joint projects, as it was the case with the assistance to the former USSR. Furthermore, the EU and Japan began to be involved in the food security projects and dialogue on Africa, which can be read as a manifestation of enlarging the security dialogue between the two partners. As the new challenges of globalization appear to dominate more and more further human development, the EU and Japan began to address the multilayered and multiplied development problems jointly through the development aid. Consequently, the concrete measures on aid development introduced in the Action Plan contributed to broadening and deepening of the scope of the European and Japanese joint activities at both bi- and multilateral levels. The recent cooperation on Doha Development Agenda, prevention of pandemic, African development, which are major issues of the EU-Japan development aid security dialogue, show that the cooperation has expanded. Insomuch as all above policies and measures relate to the human security aspect, which is on the EU-Japan joint agenda, it can be argued that there is in fact the EU-Japan security dialogue on development aid. The article suggests that the development aid was securitized in order to provide security for Japanese and European societies as well as for the entire world. Based on the above it can be concluded, as the world-wide current problems and global interdependence evolve, the EU-Japan's development aid security dialogue, which refers to both discourse and cooperation, would further be enhanced and broaden.

STRESZCZENIA / SUMMARIES / 要約

Elżbieta Kostowska-Watanabe

Social Costs of Meiji State Transformation

Profound changes of political, social and economic conditions in the 19th C. were forced on Japan by the outside world, but were implemented by Japanese samurai elites. These changes can be observed and analyzed through different theoretical frameworks. In this paper, I try to asses those theoretical frameworks for their explanatory power of the scope and vector of changes in Meiji Japan. I chose the social transformation theory as the most suitable to analyze those processes.

The Meiji transformation can be seen as an experiment in the state-controlled socio-economic management. The costs of transformation were high in terms of social destabilization, lability of attitudes and expectations towards the state. Social transformation always creates the winners and the losers. In Meiji Japan the winners were members of a new oligarchy as well as the emerging middle class. The losers were peasants, burdened with excessive taxes needed to carry out an industrialization, as well as the lower ranking samurai, the very social group which sparked the transformation.

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Olena Mykal

Development Aid in the EU-Japan Security Dialogue: Ensuring Peace and Stability by Economic Means

For a decade Japan was the largest provider of ODA (Official Development Aid) in the world. In the early 2000s due to economic difficulties it started cutting its assistance budget and the US assumed the top position. In 2005 the European Commission accounted for more than 8% of the world ODA and Japan's contribution reached 11%. At the same time European Union (European Commission and Member States) granted US\$65 billion ODA, which accounted for 56% of the world ODA. Together the EU and Japan accounted for around 67% of world development aid.

This article examines Japan and the EU's joint involvement and concrete activities on the distribution and management of the development aid in the world. It analyzes the activities in development aid area that the EU and Japan have been engaged throughout years, specifically since the moment of revealing their interest to cooperate in this area in the 1980s.

The article has a two-folded argument. First, there is a security dialogue between the EU and Japan in the development aid area that despite a lack of visibility tends to expand and diversify. Second, although development aid is commonly perceived as an economic tool to assist developing countries, this article demonstrates that the EU-Japan dialogue on aid development has been securitized in order to provide security for Japanese and European societies and the entire world.

To develop these arguments, the article proceeds in three parts. First, it examines the initiation of cooperation between the EU and Japan and the process of securitization of the development aid during the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, it illuminates the security dialogue on development aid in the mid 1990s. Finally, it examines the evolution of the EU-Japan cooperation from the late 1990s until present and shows that the EU-Japan security dialogue in development aid area has been in fact expanding and deepening.

渡辺＝コストフスカ・エルジビエタ

明治の国家変革における社会的代償

19世紀日本の政治的、経済的、社会的变化は外国によって強要されたものだが、それを実行したのは日本の武士エリート階級だった。これらの变化はいろいろな社会变化論を使って分析できる。

私は明治時代の日本の变化 の範囲と方向性 を説明することができる（あるいはできない） さまざまな理論的枠組みを紹介し、これらのプロセスを分析するために社会变化論を選ぶ。

明治の変革 は 社会 、経済管理の実験ととらえることが可能である。変革の代償は、極めて大きく、社会的不安定、態度の流動性、国家への期待を伴うものだった。変革は常に勝者と敗者を生み出す。明治時代の日本における勝者は 新しい寡頭政治のメンバーと 当時出現した中産階級だった。一方敗者は、産業化を実行するために重税も負わせられた農民と変革を引き起こした下級武士だった。

オーレナ・ムイカル

日本-EU 安全保障対話における開発援助の役割： 経済手段で平和と安定を確保する

ここ 10 年間日本は世界第一位の ODA (政府開発援助) のドナー国であった。2000 年代初頭、日本では経済的理由により援助予算が削減され始め、代わって米国が援助額トップの地位を占めるようになった。2005 年には欧州委員会は世界の ODA 総額の 8%以上、日本は 11%を占めているが、同時に欧州連合 (欧州委員会及びその加盟国) は世界の ODA 総額の 56%を占め、650 億ドルを供与しており、欧州連合 (EU) と日本は世界の援助総額の約 67%を占めた。本稿では世界における開発援助の供与及びマネージメントにおいて日本と EU の共通の関与と具体的な活動を考えてみたいと思う。また、これまでの開発経済の分野における EU 及び日本が共に携わった活動、特に同分野における協力に関する双方の関心が明らかになった 1980 年代以降の活動を検討する。

本稿には2つの論点がある。第一に、援助分野においてEUと日本の間に安全保障対話が存在し、その不可視性にも係わらず拡張し、多様化している。第二に、通常、開発援助は発展途上国に対する経済的手段として理解されるのに対し、筆者は、日本・ヨーロッパの安全保障対話は、双方の社会のみならず、全世界の安定のための安全保障となったことを示したい。

上記の議論を進めるために本稿は三部に分けられる。第一に、1980年代及び1990年代初頭の日欧間の開発援助分野における協力関係の萌芽、及びそれが安全保障対話化される過程を検討する。第二に、1990年代の半ばまでの開発援助における安全保障対話について述べる。第三に、1990年代後半から今日に至る日EU間協力の発展につき検討し、右に基づいて開発援助分野における日EU間安全保障対話が実際に拡張し、深化しつつあることを説明する。

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